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ABSTRACT: This paper offers an analysis of 'disaster capitalism', in which fear of disaster is exploited to facilitate 
the entry of a capitalist project, with regard to Jakarta’s flood policy. After a major flood hit the city in 2013, the 
Indonesian government launched a flagship megaproject, the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development 
(NCICD), as the solution for the city’s sinking problem. The plan involves closing Jakarta Bay by means of a 32-
kilometre offshore sea wall and reclaiming 5100 hectares (ha) of land. Following a corruption scandal in a related 
reclamation project (for 17 artificial islands), the NCICD plan was evaluated for six months in 2016. Although many 
criticisms of the plan surfaced during the evaluation period, they were not able to bring about radical change, i.e. 
cancellation of the project. Informed by the concept of 'critical juncture' (an analytical approach focusing on a 
short period of time in which actors’ decisions have a higher probability of affecting a particular outcome), we 
analyse the extent to which the framing of the sinking crisis by political actors can explain such a 'near-miss' 
critical juncture, where change is both possible and plausible but not achieved. Drawing data from newspaper 
discourse, interviews, and policy documents, we find that the project’s proponents have eloquently framed the 
sinking crisis in order to ensure preference for the seawall policy, including the project concerning the 17 islands 
that was claimed by the critics as the capitalist part of the project. It can be concluded that the 'disaster 
capitalism' notion helps understand this 'near-miss' outcome. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The way in which society perceives natural disasters has significantly changed over time. In the past, the 
general public accepted disasters as an act of God thus defying explanation and redress (Rosenthal, 
1998). However, in today’s risk society, disasters are no longer understood as unfortunate incidents, 
and people demand that governments act in the aftermath or during an ongoing crisis.1 A crisis can be 
perceived not only as a threat but also as an opportunity; in this sense, while it disrupts social routines, 
it also opens up political space to redefine problems and propose policy innovations. Further, a crisis 
generates what Boin et al. (2009: 81) refer to as a "framing contest", in which actors can "interpret 
events, their causes and the responsibilities and lessons involved in ways that suit their political 
purposes and visions of future policy directions". The ability of a crisis to delegitimise power and 
authoritative relationships increases the likelihood of policy change particularly in comparison to 
                                                          
1
 In this work, we use the term 'crisis' and 'disaster' interchangeably. Crisis can lead to disaster if the event is neglected or 
mismanaged (Shaluf et al., 2003). However, both disaster and crisis share many features (e.g. sudden nature of the event and 
damage caused) and, therefore, they can be used interchangeably up to a certain extent (Al-Dahash et al., 2016) 
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regular conditions (cf. Klein, 2007). Comparing 16 cases of water policy transitions worldwide, Meijerink 
and Huitema (2010: 2) observe that reforms "tend to occur only after the existing paradigm (…) has 
been put to the test by disastrous events". 
However, the nexus of crisis, disaster, and policy change does not necessarily transpire, even in the 
case of repeated disasters whose frequent occurrences help to reinforce lessons learned. For instance, 
Meijerink (2005), who studied flood policy transition in the Netherlands, found that none of the shock 
events were able to alter the state’s core dominant policy on hard structures. Droughts also provide an 
opportunity for water reforms, but their existence does not guarantee success (Grafton and Horne, 
2014); for example, the market-oriented reforms achieved during Australia’s Millennium Drought were 
reversed once the drought had ended (Crase et al., 2009; Grafton and Horne, 2014). Dynamics and 
outcomes of crisis episodes are hard to predict (Boin et al., 2005) because they are influenced by many 
factors, such as the political context, the particular crisis faced and the availability of resources to 
enable an appropriate response. Hence, the occurrence of a shock event or the prevalence of a crisis 
discourse does not guarantee a radical policy change. 
Building on this scholarship, this paper seeks to investigate the process of unmaterialised policy 
change in the wake of a crisis. We further discuss how this outcome can be linked to, or perhaps 
explained by, the 'disaster capitalism' notion, in which fear of disaster are exploited to facilitate entry 
for a capitalist project. To this end, the case of the sinking crisis in Jakarta, Indonesia, is analysed in this 
paper. 
Jakarta is one of the fastest sinking cities in the world (Deltares, 2015), together with California’s San 
Joaquin Valley, Mexico City and a few others (Ruggeri, 2017). While flooding is a notorious feature of 
the city, land subsidence has only recently been recognised in the public sphere. Parts of north Jakarta 
are subsiding at an average rate of 15 cm per year (Abidin et al., 2011); with the greatest total 
subsidence of 4.1 m between 1974 and 2010 being observed in Muara Baru (The Ministry of Public 
Works, 2011). In the academic literature, subsidence was recognised as early as 1926 (Schepers, 1926; 
Suharto, 1971), but its impacts were only apparent in 1978 via the cracking of permanent constructions 
(Abidin et al., 2008). Since then, academics have associated intensified flooding (Brinkman and 
Hartman, 2009) and increased inland seawater intrusion (Onodera et al., 2009; Soekardi et al., 1986) 
with land subsidence. Unlike flooding, subsidence on its own, due to its unnoticeable nature, was not 
able to attract policymakers’ attention sufficiently for them to act. 
However, the land subsidence issue reached policy circles only after a major flood hit Jakarta in 
2007. The flood was one of the worst in the city’s history as it inundated 60% (400 km2) of the city 
within just 24 hours, killed 79 people, displaced 500,000 people and caused almost USD690 million in 
losses (Bappenas, 2007). As a response, a study called Jakarta Coastal Defence Study (JCDS) was 
conducted to find the cause of the flood and to formulate a flood alleviation programme accordingly. 
The study found that land subsidence was one of the main factors in worsening the flood (The Ministry 
of Public Works, 2011; NL Agency, 2012). Subsidence then reached a wider audience as the study 
became a wake-up call for the people and national elites. 
The significance of Jakarta as the economic and political capital of Indonesia has made protecting 
the city from sinking a necessity. After another major flood hit the city in 2013, the Government of 
Indonesia in collaboration with the Government of the Netherlands launched the National Capital 
Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) plan. This USD40 billion project, designed by a consortium of 
Dutch firms, consists of a 32-km offshore sea wall, 1250-ha land reclamation, and a 7500-ha water 
retention basin (see Figure 1). The main focus of the NCICD is the offshore seawall, whereas the land 
reclamation (and a separate toll road project that will be built on the seawall) is justified because it 
brings private funding for the seawall. The NCICD project is divided into three phases: (i) phase A 
(originally planned for 2014-2018) focuses on strengthening existing dikes in the coastal line of Jakarta, 
(ii) phase B (2018-2040) involves building the main offshore seawall and land reclamation, and (iii) 
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phase C (2030 onwards) involves building the eastern part of the offshore seawall (NCICD, 2013). As the 
seawall will close Jakarta Bay, the NCICD, unsurprisingly, has received a great deal of criticism, 
especially with regard to its social and environmental aspects. For example, the poor water quality of 
the retention lake may lead to environmental degradation and pose health risks to coastal 
communities. 
Connections between sinking, land subsidence and flooding threats should not be confused. In this 
paper, we refer to sinking as a result of an increased risk of flooding due to land subsidence and sea-
level rise. The NCICD masterplan (NCICD, 2013) has clearly explained the rationale of the seawall. It is 
predicted that many rivers in Jakarta will not be able to flow under gravity due to subsidence. The 
offshore seawall will contain the river water and a pumping system – predicted to be the largest in the 
world with 730 m3/s – that will pump the water out to the sea. However, a direct relationship between 
the solution of the seawall and land subsidence, or simply sinking, has been portrayed in the media. In a 
later section, we will analyse the development, and simplification, of the land subsidence issue to 
understand how it has been linked to the sinking crisis and the seawall in a particular period of time. 
Figure 1. A map showing the NCICD plan in Jakarta Bay with phases A, B, C and the 17 islands’ 
reclamation project (Source: The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2014). 
 
Ever since its launch, there has been little, if any, contention about the NCICD. Its safety narratives 
dominated the public discourses and, thus, silenced the nuanced voices criticising the project 
(Octavianti and Charles, submitted-a). It is only after a corruption scandal related to the 17 artificial 
islands reclamation project that surfaced in March 2016, that the criticism surrounding the NCICD plan 
did become intense. Both the 17 islands and the NCICD plan are located in Jakarta Bay (see Figure 1), 
but they have different policy routes. The islands are merely for urban development purpose 
legitimised by a presidential decree in 1995, whereas the NCICD is a disaster preparedness plan 
launched in 2013. Following the corruption scandal, President Widodo ordered the NCICD plan to be 
evaluated for six months along with integrating the 17 islands’ reclamation project to the NCICD plan – 
making the total reclamation area of 5100 ha. This integration was a painful addition to the seawall plan 
because, at times, the islands are more disputed than the NCICD. 
The six-month evaluation period was extremely important in determining the fate of this 
megastructure. The outcome of the evaluation was the government pledging their commitment to the 
project’s phase A, which most stakeholders including the critics have agreed upon, and delayed 
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decisions on phase B and C until further studies are completed. 2 On the one hand, this decision seems 
rational – conducting thorough studies before making an important decision. On the other, it can be 
seen as a political manoeuvre to stall time before making a highly controversial decision in relation to 
the upcoming political year in 2019. Opponents expressed their concern about the 'indecisive' outcome, 
or what we label as a 'near-miss' outcome. They initially hoped that this critical period could provide a 
momentum to cancel the offshore seawall and the reclamation plans (Phases B and C), but such a policy 
change unfortunately did not materialise. Informed by the concept of 'critical juncture', this paper seeks 
to investigate why such a rare opportunity was not able to generate policy change, i.e. cancelling 
phases B and C, despite the many criticisms the project received. Furthermore, we attempt to 
understand to what extent the disaster capitalism notion can offer an answer to such an indecisive 
outcome: how did actors frame the sinking crisis to justify the ambitious project? Our argument is that 
the problematisation of land subsidence to the sinking crisis was used to maintain policy preference on 
the seawall and the reclamation project embedded in it. The disaster capitalism notion is, therefore, 
evident in explaining the near-miss outcome. 
This paper proceeds as follow. The next section reviews the literature surrounding policy change, 
particularly, in the field of crisis-related policymaking process, and critical juncture. After describing our 
methods of data collection, we proceed with an analysis of the development of the critical juncture and 
the respective role of land subsidence and political agencies in the NCICD policymaking process. 
Thereafter, we discuss the politics of idea on how the actors framed the sinking crisis, and analyse 
policy alternatives other than the seawall. We then discuss the potential causes and broader impacts of 
the near-miss event in the penultimate section, before presenting our concluding remarks. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section will review literature in two areas: (i) crisis-related policymaking process, including a brief 
description of the disaster capitalism notion, and (ii) factors constituting a critical juncture. 
Crisis-induced policy change – to adopt Sabatier’s (1999) oft-used taxonomy – has taken an ample 
portion in policy literature. Main public policy theories, namely Advocated Coalition (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999) and Punctuated Equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; True et al., 1999), 
share a focus on a major policy change (Schlager, 1999), and crisis plays a vital role in inducing this 
change. Most public policies are characterised by continuity or incremental changes (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992). In the wake of a crisis, the possibility to fundamentally alter policies is higher as players 
or policy entrepreneurs exploit the 'fluid' moment (Kingdon, 2014). A range of action is possible, from 
defending and strengthening their authority to sowing the seeds of new policies (Keeler, 1993). Boin et 
al. (2009: 83) postulate a theory of crisis exploitation to understand "the purposeful utilisation of crisis-
type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public 
policies". In exploiting this crisis-induced opportunity space (cf. Alink et al., 2001), policy entrepreneurs 
are involved in a framing contest (Boin et al., 2009), in which they offer a frame and manipulate, or 
even fight, to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative (Stone, 2001; Brändström and 
Kuipers, 2003; De Vries, 2004). 
Here, we will focus on policy change, which "occurs when there is ability to overcome dominant 
perception (frame) and to substitute an alternative construction of the reality being confronted with 
policy" (Peters et al., 2005: 1284). Change to core belief is important to be emphasised here and this 
radical change has not always materialised in the face of a crisis, like most public policy theories 
suggest. After a major flood, for example, awareness of flood protection usually dramatically climbs 
                                                          
2
 At the time of writing, the studies had been completed with minor alteration on design and are now being reviewed by the 
relevant government’s agencies. Unfortunately, they are not publicly available.  
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onto the government’s agenda. As a consequence, additional financial resources are often allocated for 
related-agencies to mitigate flood hazards. Without alteration on the basic principles and preferences 
in managing flood risk, this policy response cannot be considered as a policy change, as in the case of 
the establishment of the Delta Committee following the devastating 1953 storm surge in the 
Netherlands. The institution’s approach remained the same with the country’s previous measures on 
using hard infrastructure to fight water (Meijerink, 2005). This is also the case for Jakarta’s seawall. 
Albeit its unprecedented scale, the seawall is in line with the city’s consistent infrastructural measures 
to deal with the perennial flooding problem (Octavianti and Charles, submitted-b). What makes NCICD 
different from the previous measures is that this project brings an element of (what critics call) 
capitalism through the land reclamation project. The privately led reclamation is justified to fund the 
significant portion of the seawall. 
The disaster capitalism terminology is used by Klein (2007) in her book The shock doctrine: The rise 
of disaster capitalism,3 where she explored how capitalism came to dominate the world with the help 
of violent shock tactics in times of natural disaster or other calamities. For example, Klein argue that the 
2004 tsunami paved the way for the Government of Sri Lanka to force the fishermen off beachfront 
property, so it could be sold to hotel developers. Another example is how the destruction of New 
Orleans by Hurricane Katrina allowed most of the city’s public schools to be replaced by privately run 
charter schools. She paints a disturbing portrait on the use of terror, including deliberately creating a 
crisis, to achieve a capitalist system, for example, the use of torture in Chile and Argentina’s military 
dictatorship to break down resistance to a free market. Whilst we are not fully convinced by her 
arguments, we see the value of her main argument that "countries are shocked – by wars, terror 
attacks, coups d’état and natural disasters. And then they are shocked again – by corporations and 
politicians who exploit the fear and disorientation of this first shock to push through economic shock 
therapy" (Klein, 2007: 25). 
We observe two factors that make the notion of disaster capitalism different from other crisis-
related policy theory, particularly Boin et al’.s (2009) crisis exploitation theory. First, the outcome of a 
crisis in the former approach is focused on establishing a capitalist system or pursuing a capitalist 
project, while the latter does not specify the outcome of a crisis. Second, the theory of crisis 
exploitation focuses on the use of discourse as an exploitation strategy, but disaster capitalism uses 
both discourse and action on the ground to achieve the so-called 'shock therapy'. To our understanding, 
if discourse on the threat of dike failure is sufficient for the government to set the agenda, as crisis 
exploitation theory would have it, disaster capitalism may seek to give it an extra push by, for example, 
intentionally creating a rupture in the dike which in turn would cause its failure, so that a capitalist 
project can proceed. This may sound extreme and, therefore, in this paper we carefully employ insights 
from disaster capitalism to understand the extent to which players exploit the fear of the sinking crisis 
to push reclamation as a capitalist project and whether this idea can offer an answer to the near-miss 
critical juncture to cancel the whole project. 
We then move to review literature in critical juncture scholarship as this concept provides the 
analytical framework for this study. According to Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), critical junctures are 
"the relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that 
agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest" (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 348, italics in 
original). Critical juncture has been widely used in many disciplines and has been imported to political 
science in the area of historical institutionalism to answer critics on the incapability of historical 
institutionalism to explain institutional change (Peters et al., 2005). Critical juncture interrupts a stable 
                                                          
3
 This book has unsurprisingly sparked debates. Some prominent actors, such as the Columbia University’s Centre for 
Sustainable Development Earth director Jeffrey Sachs, did not agree to most of the account of himself portrayed in the book 
(Pilkington, 2008). 
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institution’s path; during the juncture, a new objective in the policy was assigned and political resources 
evolve to sustain those new policies (North, 1990; Steinmo et al., 1992). In water policy, the approach 
has been used, for example, to explain water reforms in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (Marshall and 
Alexandra, 2016). Analysing the environmental water recovery in the basin, they found that crisis-
induced opportunity to introduce policy innovation is limited without the presence of active policy 
entrepreneurs. 
Literature on critical juncture can be broadly grouped based on two dominant factors contributing to 
the outcome: antecedent conditions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Slater and Simmons, 2010) and political 
agencies (Ertman, 2010; Nichols and Myers, 2010). Antecedent conditions are an important backdrop 
during a critical juncture (Mahoney, 2001). They define a range of institutional alternatives available to 
policymakers and at the same time limit the alternative options (Capoccia, 2016). Scholars of critical 
juncture use antecedent condition to build a discussion on 'divergence': "a 'common exogenous shock' 
affects a set of cases (typically countries), causing them to 'diverge'" (Capoccia, 2016: 93). Multiple case 
studies were employed in this sense to analyse the extent to which their different antecedent 
conditions cause them to diverge after a shock. This study scrutinises critical juncture development of a 
single case study and therefore it provides different empirical insights. 
We focus on land subsidence as an antecedent condition and examine the development of the 
discourse through mass media. The exploitation of this issue is principally acted out in two areas: the 
mass media and official inquiries (Boin et al., 2009). We emphasise the utilisation of mass media in this 
research but have also consulted official reports and other documentations. Mass media has agenda 
setting power for which it prompts policymakers to take action and satisfy the public’s interest and 
demand for answers (Birkland, 1997). Authors have suggested that media do not reflect reality but 
rather shape it (Miles and Morse, 2007). Furthermore, their focus on a few issues leads the public to 
perceive those issues as more important than others (McCombs et al., 2005). Therefore, media 
constitutes a prime arena where framing contest takes place. Both status quo players and change 
advocates have to attract and convince newsmakers of their particular crisis frame. Therefore, crisis 
communication skill that is supported by scientific evidence (see Parkhurst, 2017) is indispensable. The 
rival interpretation of the role of media in the wake of a crisis is that they pursue their own agenda in 
crisis reporting (see Streitmatter, 1997). This means that the actors’ performances are less important 
than the degree to which their frames fit the pre-existing biases of the main media outlets. 
The second determinant of critical juncture is the interaction of political agencies during the 
juncture. The role of key actors and their political interactions prior to deciding a path of institutional 
development are crucial. Like other scholars employing critical juncture (Barke and Jenkin-Smith, 1993), 
we emphasise analyses on political agencies and their actors rather than on institutions. This is also 
different from typical historical institutionalism analysis that overemphasises the role of bureaucrats 
and belittles politicians as creative actors (Peters et al., 2005). Agencies consist of political actors and 
they become creative when seeking political consensus and forming coalitions as they must compete to 
occupy limited 'political space' (Pierson, 2000). The importance of agencies and choices vary at every 
critical juncture (Collier and Collier, 1991). 
Some authors have compared the concept of critical juncture with other policy frameworks. 
Richards and Smith (1997: 66, emphasis added), for example, demonstrate that critical junctures are 
not interchangeable with other terms, such as window of opportunity, because they work in different 
stages of the policy process. They argue that critical juncture is "a distinct (…) and lasting (…) change 
(…), brought about by exogenous and endogenous pressure", while windows of opportunity are "spaces 
for change created by exogenous and endogenous pressures". In other words, critical juncture is the 
outcome of the utilisation of windows of opportunity. Therefore, according to them, critical juncture is 
not interchangeable with terms such as crisis, turning points, unsettled times, window of opportunity 
(Kingdon, 2014), formatting moments, and punctuated equilibrium (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
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This relates to the temporality of a critical juncture, whether it is just a point or moment in a path-
dependent process or whether the juncture itself is a process and thus may be better referred to as a 
time period. We follow explanation by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 361) to determine the criticality of 
a juncture and solve this temporality issue. They argue that "the briefer a critical juncture is relative to 
the duration of the path-dependent causal process that it instigates, the more critical it is". We adopt 
this operationalisation to analyse critical juncture in this work that powerful actors took decisions 
during a narrowly circumscribed period rather than in a moment of choice. 
However, contrary to Richards and Smith’s (1997) argument that change is the key element of a 
critical juncture, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) argue that change is not a necessary element of a critical 
juncture. Other outcomes include, among others, re-equilibration and near-miss. Re-equilibration refers 
to a condition where institutional change resulted from a critical juncture is not permanent and can 
therefore lead to the re-equilibration to the old path-dependent institutions. Whilst near-miss refers to 
a condition where change is possible and sought after, it narrowly fails to occur (Capoccia, 2015). One 
example of this negative case is Nichols and Myers’s (2010) on the theory of 'reconstructive presidency' 
in the United States. They argue that not all presidents have seized the opportunity to transform 
political order in a vulnerable regime. 
After reviewing key literature in the field of crisis-related policy change and critical juncture, we 
hope to contribute to them in two ways. First, this paper offers a view on crisis-related policymaking 
process and examines the potential role of disaster capitalism in that process. Our focus on land 
subsidence crisis gives a certain nuance to most policy work as its unnoticeable nature is less likely to 
push for immediate policy action, as opposed to flooding, for example. Second, we hope this paper can 
enrich empirical insights for critical juncture literature by the examination of a negative case. This near-
miss phenomenon that has not been much investigated will be a fruitful contribution to this field. 
Moreover, our experimentation of the application of critical juncture concept in a contemporary event 
is hoped to bring new insights for critical juncture analysis. 
METHODS 
Data collection for this study includes semi-structured interviews and newspaper analysis. Fieldwork 
was conducted in Jakarta from May to September 2016 and July 2017. Forty-five informants were 
interviewed using a snowball sampling approach; informants included government officials from central 
government (CG= 8) and local government (LG = 8), non-government organisation activists (NG=8), 
academics (AC=12), and other experts (KI= 9) (see Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees). We use the 
code of interviews (e.g. AC for academics) to refer to evidence coming from a particular interview. The 
expertise of the informants spans across urban development policy, conservation and environmental 
policy, water and wastewater policy, engineering and community engagement. The questions in the 
interviews were regarding the informants’ views on the land subsidence problem, flood alleviation 
measures, and the NCICD plan. Interviews were audio-recorded with consent from the informants. 
Newspaper articles were analysed to examine public discourse around land subsidence, flooding and 
NCICD. Knowledge on how the media gather and distribute the news is important in understanding 
public policy priorities for natural disasters (McCombs et al., 1997; Tierney et al., 2006). We undertook 
an extensive article search in Google News using the keyword 'land subsidence Jakarta' and 'penurunan 
muka tanah Jakarta' with a time span from 1 January 2007 to 31 July 2017. We screened articles both in 
English and Bahasa Indonesia published by local and international media. After the elimination of 
irrelevant articles, 405 articles remained. Such articles appear frequently in the following media: 
Kompas (65 articles), The Jakarta Post (26 articles) and Liputan 6 (20 articles). Subsidence was put as 
the core issue, and topics associated with it were then analysed. Newspapers constituting the primary 
media source provide insights into the dynamics of public discourse and capture interactions in the 
political area by accommodating contested views from various stakeholders (Protess and McCombs, 
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1991; Chan and Lee, 2014). It is anticipated that newspapers may only cover mainstream news 
(Newman, 2011). We expect marginalised views to be covered in the interviews by our attempt to 
interview informants with a variety of backgrounds. Lastly, data from publicly available information 
directly attributable to key governmental actors and institution were also collected, such as policy 
documents. 
Before we proceed, a methodological caveat is in order. While attempts were made to 
accommodate views from a range of actors – both proponents and opponents of the project – it is 
recognised that there may be subjectivity in presenting those views in this paper. In addition, there may 
also be other antecedent conditions, such as the structure of the administration or the national political 
context, that contribute to the development of the juncture and the outcomes. 
CRITICAL JUNCTURE ANALYSIS 
We begin this section by analysing the criticality of a juncture in the NCICD policymaking process before 
focusing on two areas of the juncture: antecedent conditions and political agencies. 
Development of the critical juncture 
Figure 2 shows the NCICD’s policy process in chronological order. As most of the process has been 
discussed in the introductory section, this section only picks up some important milestones relevant for 
the analysis of the critical juncture. Prior to NCICD, the government published the Jakarta Coastal 
Defence Strategy (JCDS) plan in 2011 as a response to the 2007 flood.4 The JCDS was similar to the 
current NCICD plan, but without the Garuda-bird shaped reclamation element. Compared with the 2007 
flood, the damage caused by the 2013 flood was less severe5 but the latter was able to push the seawall 
proposal. This is because the flood occurred at a crucial time and place. It happened just three months 
after Governor Widodo was sworn in October 2012 and the area flooded was also significant: the 
centre of government and business activities in central Jakarta. This flood exposed the deficiency of the 
current flood policy and provided a major opportunity to introduce a policy (Alink et al., 2001). 
Figure 2. A timeline showing key events (i.e. flooding, administration change) related to the policy 
development of NCICD. The critical juncture that occurred during the evaluation period of the 
project is from April to November 2016. 
 
The strengthening of the 4.5 km of the existing dikes (Phase A) was done in 2013 in a rush, just ten days 
before President Yudhoyono stepped down from the presidency (Elyda and Dewi, 2014). The ability to 
                                                          
4
 Other than the seawall, some important policies were implemented, such as the World Bank’s dredging project known as 
JEDI (Jakarta Emerging Dredging Initiative) (The World Bank, 2015).  
5
 The 2013 flood inundated 14% of the city with 20 people killed and 50,000 evacuees (BNPB, 2013), while the 2007 flood 
inundated 60% of the city with 79 people killed and 500,000 evacuees (Bappenas, 2007). 
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launch such massive infrastructure was a feat for the outgoing government. Following this, no 
significant policy progress for NCICD was made until a corruption case of the 17 islands project received 
wide press coverage in March 2016. A chairman of Jakarta’s leading private developer bribed a Jakarta 
councillor who had a key role in passing the reclamation project’s draft bylaw. The bribe was intended 
to lower the developer’s 15% contribution clause in the bylaw to only 5% (Artharini, 2016).6 We see 
that political pressure towards NCICD was an unintended consequence (Pierson, 2000) of the 17 
islands’ corruption case. This ripple effect caused NCICD to be evaluated as the public questioned the 
benefit of this multibillion-dollar project. 
Following the political chaos after the corruption case, President Widodo (former Governor of 
Jakarta) restated the importance of NCICD plan and decided to proceed with the plan: 
It is estimated that all of North Jakarta will sink below sea level by 2030. As a result, 13 rivers passing 
through Jakarta cannot flow into Jakarta Bay. Therefore, management of Jakarta’s water and environment 
must be integrated from upstream to downstream. Coastal development in North Jakarta, NCICD (…) a 
project that has been developed for long enough becomes an answer for Jakarta [President Widodo, 27 
April 2016, in Kuwado (2016a)]. 
He further ordered the NCICD plan to be evaluated for six months (from April to November 2016), and 
the 17 islands reclamation project to be integrated with the NCICD plan. We consider that this 
evaluation period is the critical juncture for the NCICD policy. In mid-November 2016, the President 
requested the Ministry of Planning to focus on Phase A (strengthening the existing sea walls along 
Jakarta’s coastlines) (Pitoko, 2016). Decisions on the other two phases (phase B – main offshore sea 
wall, land reclamation and retention basin, and phase C – eastern offshore sea wall) were delayed until 
further studies were completed. 
The criticality of the above juncture can be analysed against the critical juncture criteria: duration of 
the juncture or 'temporal leverage' and probability of impactful decision or 'probability jump' (Capoccia 
and Kelemen, 2007). First, the duration of the juncture (6 months) is briefer that the NCICD policy 
process, from its inception since after the 2007 flood to just prior to the juncture. Conflict over ideas 
and underlying assumptions of NCICD was only evident during this evaluation period. This finding is 
aligned with Thelen and Conran (2016) who maintain that not all 'collisions' occurred were 
consequential. Collisions that occurred during the evaluation period were desirable to evaluate the 
plan. 
The second aspect is the probability jump; it refers to the choices made during the juncture having a 
higher probability to affect the outcome of interest compared with the probability before and after the 
juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). Before the juncture that was initiated by a corruption case in 
March 2016, NCICD had not shown significant progress since its launch in November 2014. During the 
critical juncture, a variety of responses, mainly critics from non-state actors, surfaced. Policymakers 
accommodated these critics by focusing on Phase A, the least controversial phase. After the juncture, 
no substantial decisions have been made and political tension on this issue has relaxed. 
Land subsidence as an antecedent condition 
The development of land subsidence discourse in the media worked as a powerful antecedent 
condition and became incredibly important in further policy chain. The land subsidence issue was used 
                                                          
6
 The developer tried to influence the outcome of deliberations on two draft bylaws concerning North Jakarta Coastal Zoning 
plan. Based on the bylaw, the developer is required to hand over 15% of the reclaimed land to the city administration. The 
developer had promised the councillor that he could deliver IDR 2.5 billion (approximately USD 180,000) if he could pass the 
reclamation project’s draft bylaw and lower the developer’s contribution to only 5%. This request was accepted by the 
councillor (Heriyanto, 2016). 
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as a discursive tool to problematise the sinking threat as a definite crisis and helped justify NCICD as the 
solution. Subsidence has been construed by the public to lead to sinking, and therefore to the 
worsening of flooding when combined with sea level rise as illustrated in Figure 3. Sinking is a larger 
disaster than flooding and thus a sinking threat posed a greater demand for relief that was answered by 
the NCICD proposal. 
Interest over land subsidence increased substantially after the 2013 flood or precisely after the 
launch of the NCICD, although findings from the JCDS report confirming the subsidence threat were 
disseminated in 2011. Historical analysis of newspaper articles on land subsidence suggests that the 
issue was present infrequently prior to 2013 (Figure 4). Subsidence gained the highest interest during 
2016 when the critical juncture was taking place. Further analysis of these subsidence-related articles 
reveals a strong association between land subsidence and the sinking threat followed by NCICD and 
reclamation topics. 
The media played a crucial role in fostering a sense of vulnerability in Jakarta. Perceptions of crisis 
are likely to vary in a society reflecting different values and positions; therefore, the supporter of the 
project recognised a need to shape the perception of the public of the crisis through the media. 
Provocative titles, such as Jakarta Bisa Tenggelam (Jakarta could sink) (Kompas, 2010) and Benarkah 14 
tahun lagi Jakarta Utara akan tenggelam? (Will North Jakarta sink in 14 years?) (Harap, 2016) aimed to 
make people question their safety in the city. The use of such emotive labels (Wagner-Pacifici, 1994; 
Howarth et al., 2000) was meant to facilitate the introduction of NCICD as a megaproject that was likely 
to ignite dispute. With regard to the argument of Boin et al. (2009) on the role of political actors vs. 
media, we observe that within the subsidence discourse, the preexisting biases of the media (e.g. the 
media’s political stance in news coverage) was not evident. Rather, the political actors and their crisis 
frames played an important role in shaping the discourse. It is worth noting, however, that media bias 
may be more prevailing in the case of the reclamation scandal, which is a different issue. 
Figure 3. Illustration of the impact of tides and subsidence on increasing the city’s sinking risk. 
 
Note: The combination of land subsidence at a rate of 40-60 cm/18 years and rise of sea level at a rate of 5 cm/18 years has 
caused Pasar Ikan, the reference point, to sink. The use of the National Monument (Monas), the symbol of Jakarta, to 
represent its sinking demonstrates the significance of the sinking threat to Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia (Source: 
Brinkman and Hartman, 2009). 
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Figure 4. Number of newspaper articles containing land subsidence increased substantially after the 
2013 major flood (it reached its peak in 2016 when the critical juncture was taking place). 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of topics associated with land subsidence per year (2007-July 2017). 
Problematisation of subsidence as a crisis is the highest followed by the NCICD and 
reclamation topics. 
 
Our previous analysis (Octavianti and Charles, submitted-a) shows that there are four dominant 
discourses on NCICD: safety, socio-environment, economic and political discourses. The safety 
discourse has been used by the proponents of NCICD (government, consultants, developers and some 
academics) to push the megaproject. A power play emerged from the struggle of different actors to 
establish the dominant discourse or storyline: 
If no measures are taken, a large part of the coastal zone is under threat of permanent inundation. In this 
area, the lives of 4.5 million people are at stake. Material damage due to permanent inundation is 
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calculated at USD103 billion for loss of land and buildings only. The damage to the economy will be even 
greater (The Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014: 23). 
The characteristic of a disaster affects the policy response it triggers. For instance, Birkland (2006) 
shows that the scientific, social and political responses to earthquakes are more well-ordered than are 
the responses to hurricanes in the US political context. More attention paid to earthquake mitigation 
than those to hurricanes may be caused by the difficulty in creating an insurance programme for 
earthquakes (Birkland, 2006). In Jakarta, both flooding and land subsidence are important exogenous 
drivers, but they have different characteristics in terms of policy impact. Unlike the immediate threat of 
a flood, land subsidence is a gradual phenomenon that does not create the urgency of actions and 
therefore is not an efficient focusing event. This temporal characteristic of the land subsidence crisis is 
similar to that of drought and climate change. The boiling frog analogy describes the inability or 
unwillingness (Birkland, 2006) to respond to threats that arise gradually (Gore and O’Connor, 2007). 
Policy responses to such crises are usually limited to incremental changes. Without the flood, land 
subsidence may never receive such significant attention. 
This section has discussed the process of land subsidence problematisation and the landscape of the 
crisis discourse that works as a powerful antecedent condition. The discourse has been eloquently used 
by influential actors to push a particular solution, which we now turn to. 
The role of political agencies 
While exogenous factors, like crises, can provide powerful catalysts for policy change, active and 
disruptive policy entrepreneurs are required to reinforce institutional innovation (Marshall and 
Alexandra, 2016). Here we discuss the extent to which political agencies play this role in providing, and 
pushing, answers for the land subsidence crisis. His decision on NCICD is one of President Widodo’s 
important moves in his presidency. His action to meet critics’ concern by commissioning a review 
demonstrates his political manoeuvre to prevent a potential collapse in public confidence. Analysing it 
from a broader political context, President Widodo’s aim to distribute economic growth in the eastern 
part of Indonesia (PresidenRI, 2016) might also affect his stance towards the NCICD project. This should 
be analysed within the context of the next presidential election in 2019. The question is whether his 
decision on NCICD as a politically difficult project will help or hinder his re-election. He must 
compromise long-term plans like NCICD to shorter policy objectives, particularly concerning the 
election. Although pursuing phase A is considered as a sensible decision, the impression left is that he is 
stalling for time. 
Various political agencies were involved in the policy development of NCICD. At least five 
stakeholders play an important role in this policy-making process: the Indonesian government, foreign 
experts, private sectors, NGO activists, and academics. Unlike the JCDS project that was under the 
authority of the Jakarta Province, NCICD is a national-level project and therefore the local government 
tends not to intervene in the policymaking process (LG1). The Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs 
was the lead agency in this process prior to the corruption scandal. They coordinated meetings among 
central government, local government, other governmental agencies, and consultants (KI6). Their 
authority was then transferred to the Ministry of Planning (Bappenas) whose primary task was to 
conduct an evaluation study. Bappenas has been playing a critical role since the 2007 flood by seeking 
Dutch assistance in the JCDS study and by creating seminars to disseminate findings from JCDS and 
promoting NCICD (Bappenas, 2016). 
The role of private (Kurniawan, 2016) and foreign interests (Alexander, 2015) was prominent in this 
policymaking process. Private contributions are needed to fund the sea wall through the issuance of 
land reclamation permits, while foreign involvement is required for technology transfer. Both private 
and foreign actors do not have the power to translate their innovations or contribution into legitimised 
policy and therefore they need to build a close relationship with policymakers. Critics charge that they 
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have gone far by taking a leading role in driving the policymaking process (Bakker et al., 2017; AC4; 
NG3). NGO activists, primarily from Rujak Centre and Ciliwung Institute, and some academics have 
argued that the NCICD will only benefit particular stakeholders at the expense of marginal communities, 
especially fishing communities (NG3). There is no consensus among academics regarding their stance 
towards the project. Most of them share similar thoughts to those of NGO activists, while some, 
particularly those who have a role in the bureaucracy, strongly support the project. The rest are rather 
neutral and thus neither give staunch support nor reject the project. The central role of experts and 
their lack of consensus is partly the reason why this project seems to be locked in the 'for or against' 
binary, given the highly technical nature of the project. 
There are two types of interaction worth highlighting here; the first one is between policymakers 
and the Dutch firms. A Memorandum of Understanding in the field of water between the Government 
of Indonesia and the Netherlands has existed since 2001, with a recent update in 2015. The 
memorandum "lays the framework for intensive cooperation", such as "staff training, educational 
programmes, and exchanging experts" (Colven, 2017: 259). For example, the provincial government of 
Jakarta sending its staff to the Netherlands to do a range of internships, workshops and conferences in 
order to learn the "best water management practices" adopted by Dutch engineers and policymakers 
(Dutch Water Sector, 2014 cited in Colven, 2017: 259). 
A high-level partnership around NCICD has been established between the Governments of Indonesia 
and the Netherlands since the 2013 flood. Leaders of the two countries often visited each other. The 
most remarkable visit was when the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, led a large trade delegation to 
Indonesia in 2016. The delegation included two Dutch ministers, one Dutch vice minister, and about 
110 Dutch businesses – almost half of them were companies in the water sector (Government of the 
Netherlands, 2016). This demonstrates the concept of economic diplomacy that the Dutch government 
officially promotes through its Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) institution (Bakker et al., 2017). 
The Dutch government has committed to provide a total budget of €8 million for general consultancy 
and the Knowledge Management unit of the NCICD organisation. They financed the NCICD Master Plan 
through overseas development assistance (ODA). This aid relationship is expected to transform 
gradually into trade relations ('from aid to trade'). This ODA money will be used to develop a financial 
strategy to attract public and private investors to participate in the prestigious project (Bakker et al., 
2017). According to a survey by Aidenenvironment (2015), Indonesia is the most important client for 
the Dutch water business as it made up more than 30% of its business turnover as per December 2015. 
Another political interaction observed is between policymakers, especially former Governor of 
Jakarta, Basuki Tjahja Purnama, and private property developers. This interaction is specifically 
concerning the disputed permit of the reclamation project of the 17 islands. Governor Purnama 
strongly supported the reclamation of Jakarta Bay. He was even allegedly involved in the corruption 
(Carina, 2016), but later proven innocent. Purnama asserted that his administration could not cancel 
the 17 islands reclamation because the plan was based on a legally binding regulation, the 1995 
Presidential Decree. He further argued that if the current government cancelled the developers’ 
permits, it would be required to pay high levels of compensation to developers. Therefore, Purnama 
attempted to gain as much benefit from the project by increasing the additional contribution from 5 to 
15%. From this contribution alone, Jakarta could earn up to IDR 179 trillion (approximately USD13 
billion) (Belarminus, 2016) to build infrastructure, such as road and low-cost apartments (rumah susun). 
Due to his strong support to the reclamation project and his policy of forcibly evicting people living on 
'illegal' land, he has been labelled by some groups as the 'governor for developer' (NG5; Kuwado, 
2016b). Reclamation was a contested topic for a recent gubernatorial election held in February 2017, in 
which Anies Baswedan, a new candidate, beat Purnama, the incumbent. In his campaign, Baswedan 
pledged to cancel the reclamation; a stark difference with Purnama’s position to keep the reclamation 
going (Wardi, 2017). 
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At the national-level politics, a cabinet reshuffle replacing the Coordinating Minister of Maritime 
Affairs in July 2016 was allegedly related to this reclamation dispute (Jamil, 2016). According to the 
opponent of the project (NG2; AC10), Rizal Ramli was replaced by Luhut Pandjaitan because Ramli was 
brave enough to cancel the reclamation permit of one of the 17 islands (Island G) one month before the 
reshuffle. Pandjaitan, the successor, regranted the permit to the developer in September 2017. He 
suggested that land reclamation is a solution to subsidence and warned Baswedan regarding his 
intention to cancel the reclamation project. The quote below demonstrates how Pandjaitan conflated 
the 17 islands reclamation and the seawall projects: 
If you want to stop it [reclamation], do it. If Jakarta is sinking or subsiding further, you [new governor who 
is opposed to the reclamation] must take the responsibility [Minister Pandjaitan, 8 May 2017, in 
Ihsanuddin (2017)]. 
The framing contest during this juncture took place in a number of forums, such as focus group 
discussions with experts, organised both by status quo players (primarily government, consultants and 
developers) and by change advocates (a coalition of NGOs activists, concerned academics). The purpose 
of such discussions was not only to collect diverse perspectives on the plan but also to exploit multiple 
venues to promote each coalition’s ideas or 'venue shopping', following True et al. (1999). 
The interaction of stakeholders involved and their main narratives about NCICD, measured by the 
frequency of newspaper articles, can be divided into three stages: pre-, during, and post-critical 
juncture (Figure 6). Policymakers have been constantly promoting NCICD to solve the sinking crisis in 
the three stages. The promotion of Dutch expertise in the project was notable in the pre-critical 
juncture. However, the social and environmental impacts of NCICD voiced by NGOs and some 
concerned academics gained more space during and after the juncture, weakening the discourse on the 
excellence of the Dutch. This shows that the constrained environment was relaxed during the 
evaluation period thus creating an opportunity for the critics to actively voice their concerns, 
challenging the advocates’ narratives and swaying public opinion. Developers’ narratives were quite 
dominant before the critical juncture to promote the aspiration of a world-class city. However, during 
the juncture, their main narrative changed to emphasizing the difficulty to cancel the project due to its 
legal status. The narrative shift indicates that developers were negotiating the fate of the reclamation 
with policymakers. 
THE POLITICS OF IDEAS 
This section presents an analysis (i) of the extent to which the notion of disaster capitalism is relevant 
to describe Jakarta’s sinking crisis and (ii) of the policy options other than the NCICD plan. 
Some authors (e.g. Hogan and Doyle, 2007) maintain that decisions taken at the critical juncture are 
ultimately shaped by the interests of political agencies, and to a lesser extent by antecedent conditions. 
Ertman (2010: 1008), for example, argues that personal choices made by influential actors were the 
main factor in the critical juncture, rather than a "long and continuous build-up pressure". In Jakarta, 
the decisions of influential actors dominate in the selection of a future path (on whether or not to 
proceed with NCICD), but the problematisation of land subsidence as a sinking crisis has played a 
significant role in legitimising this ambitious idea. Land subsidence is not just an antecedent condition 
but, using Slater and Simmons’ (2010) term, it is a 'critical antecedent'. As an exogenous shock, it opens 
the door for institutional innovation in the form of NCICD. The role of agency to push the NCICD idea is 
extremely important as argued by Peters et al. (2005: 1296): "ideas without agency cannot be effective 
but agencies without ideas cannot provide any direction to change". In the process of institutionalising  
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Figure 3. Three stages (pre, during, and post-critical juncture) of political interaction in the NCICD 
policymaking process. 
 
Note: Each stakeholder promoted one main narrative as shown inside the pentagon. The changing of dominance of the 
narratives in the three stages is depicted with the weighs of arrows: light, medium, and bold. 
NCICD ideas, we argue that land subsidence as an antecedent condition was constructed to empower 
certain political forces for change. Both exogenous (crisis) and endogenous (inherent characteristics of 
the agency) factors have combined in creating and using the current junctures. 
Analysing deeper the use of crisis to win the framing contest, we observe that the proponents of 
NCICD (government, consultants, developers and some academics) did not blame the responsible 
authorities for subsidence. Conversely, the opponents (NGOs and concerned academics) framed the 
sinking crisis as a government’s failure to manage groundwater usage. They did so because the 
alternative solutions they offered were related to this groundwater issue, which will be discussed 
further below. The blame was diffused – not focused on any particular individuals or the policies they 
embody. The preference for the NCICD plan by national elites may be partly attributed to a no-blame 
strategy (Bovens, 1998) that serves to get policymakers 'off the hook' and leave existing policies intact. 
Revisiting the disaster capitalism notion, we ask to what extent the notion is prevalent in Jakarta’s 
sinking crisis. We analyse it in two steps: the sinking crisis utilisation and the addition of the reclamation 
project. First, our previous discussion has demonstrated how actors have skilfully capitalised on the 
sinking crisis to push for the NCICD project. Here, we emphasise how this crisis framing could survive 
during the juncture. The continued power of the framing can be explained by Molle’s (2008) analogy of 
the snowballing effect. He describes a new concept as a snowball that needs a big initial push to 
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maintain its momentum once launched downhill. The key in this process is to make the concept self-
sustained. The corruption scandal creating the juncture initiated the sunshine (or rainy) period to melt 
the ball. But the intensive problematisation of the sinking crisis (see Figure 4 – how the government 
maintains a safety discourse in the pre-, during and post-critical juncture phases) enabled the ball to 
maintain its shape, and its discursive power. 
We see that the crisis framing has been supported by the political use of uncertainty. Policymakers 
took advantage of the unknown sinking threats to create their storyline. Actors intensely promoted 
NCICD as the infrastructural saviour from sinking, such as the former Governor Purnama (also known as 
Ahok): Ahok sebut tanggul raksasa bisa hindari Jakarta tenggelam (Ahok said Giant Sea Wall [NCICD] 
can prevent Jakarta from sinking) (Juniman, 2016). Because of this uncertainty embedded in how 
sinking may materialise in the future, people were convinced of the only solution floating on the 
agenda. Furthermore, national elites believed in the expertise of Dutch engineers as the world’s water 
experts. Such policy lessons from foreign experts are often put forward as politically neutral truths, but 
this may, and is often, not the case (Robertson, 1991). The Dutch have a strong historic relationship 
with Jakarta as they governed the first three centuries of water management in the city (Octavianti and 
Charles, submitted-b). Thus, their involvement is justified and fits well to answer the future sinking 
threat. 
Second, the addition of the 17 islands reclamation project to the NCICD plan reduced the safety 
elements (protection from sinking) that this project originally aimed at (NG1; KI4). The central 
government changed the concept of coastal defence (JCDS) to coastal development (NCICD) with a 
current tagline of "changing threat into opportunity" (The Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2014). Although the new concept contains the same seawall proposal, it is much more attractive for 
private funding because of the reclamation element. This suggests that NCICD facilitates the approval of 
this highly disputed reclamation project. 
Although we do not fully endorse Klein’s notion of disaster capitalism, we argue that this notion 
prevails to a considerable extent in the NCICD case. The narrative in the media supported by the 
seemingly self-evident facts about the sinking crisis justified the reclamation project embedded in the 
NCICD. Based on our evidence here, we cannot say definitely that the NCICD plan was deliberately 
created to facilitate a broader capitalism agenda, but we can conclude that the sinking crisis has been 
politicised to pave the way for the NCICD project. 
We now discuss the policy alternatives available other than the NCICD plan. The NCICD master plan 
only offered two responses to the sinking problem: (i) doing nothing which means abandoning north 
Jakarta and losing USD103 billion, or (ii) pursuing NCICD. Of course, doing nothing is not an option 
anyone would pursue, although there is an idea to move the capital city from Jakarta.7 
During a critical juncture, a broader than normal range of feasible options surfaces (Pierson, 2000). 
This can be seen in Jakarta where some alternatives, mainly proposed by academics, to the sinking 
problem surfaced in the public sphere. One alternative is to invest in several smaller projects to stop 
subsidence in the first place. These demands were far from new as they had been voiced many times in 
different 'venues' but only made it to political centre stage during the critical juncture. Critics argue that 
NCICD does not contain a plan to solve subsidence itself, although the subsidence problem and its link 
to groundwater extraction were recognised in the plan. The disconnection between the problem 
(subsidence) and the solution pursued (seawall) was highlighted by an informant: 
                                                          
7
 This idea came up because of the overcrowding problem in the city of 10 million and regular traffic congestion. The National 
Ministry of Planning (Bappenas) confirmed that only presidential and ministerial offices would be moved, and Jakarta would 
remain a business centre. Two candidate areas are Palangkaraya, Kalimantan and Jonggol, West Java. The first president of 
Indonesia, Soekarno, had actually planned to base the central government in Kalimantan in 1957, but this never happened 
(Chan, 2017).  
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NCICD is a severe logical fallacy (…) If we succeed in stopping subsidence, why do we need phase B and C 
[creating an outer sea wall]? It is like treating cancer with cold medicine, doesn’t make any sense (NG7). 
Land subsidence is purported to be caused by overexploitation of deep groundwater due to insufficient 
water services. Abidin et al. (2008) report a correlation between the lowering of groundwater levels 
and the occurrence of land subsidence. They further argue that there is a strong correlation between 
land subsidence and urban development activities in the city (Abidin et al., 2011). However, the relative 
contribution of other factors, namely natural consolidation of alluvial soil and tectonic activities 
(Murdohardono and Sudarsono, 1998; Rismianto and Mak, 1993), are not yet known. Most people in 
Jakarta use a mix of water sources (Kooy et al., 2016) to complement the unreliable piped water 
services that serve 60% of the population (PAM Jaya, 2016). Progress in drinking water services has 
been limited, with only a 12% increase in coverage in 17 years (PAM Jaya, 2016). This is due to several 
causes, such as shortages of raw water, illegal water use and lack of integration among stakeholders 
under the public-private partnership scheme (Bakker et al., 2008). To complicate things, some people 
who have water connections opt out from the system because of the unreliable quality and quantity of 
water, and thus prefer to use other water alternatives, primarily groundwater (Furlong and Kooy, 
2017). The sanitation service is even worse, serving only 7% of the population (PAL Jaya, 2016). This 
results in river water that is highly polluted and costly to treat. These poor water supply and sanitation 
services contribute to subsidence. 
The consultant who designed the project also highlights the importance of dealing with the 
subsidence issue: "Unless subsidence stops, NCICD won’t work" (KI5). This contrasts with the public 
discourse that portrays NCICD as a direct solution to land subsidence, as illustrated by the headline: 
"NCICD expedited to prevent land subsidence" (Oktara, 2017). Policy entrepreneurs who simplified this 
complex story of NCICD (see Octavianti and Charles, submitted-a) have left an impression in the public 
realm that NCICD is an all-encompassing solution for all water problems, including land subsidence (e.g. 
Ihsanuddin, 2017). 
While the amplification of the land subsidence issue in public discourse has made the society aware 
of the problem, no significant efforts to stop subsidence have been made.8 A firm conclusion regarding 
the cause of subsidence has not yet been reached, but providing 100% piped water supply is a no-
regret policy9 in Jakarta and should slow down subsidence. Providing water connection, however, does 
not suffice on its own as it should be accompanied with good and reliable services (Furlong and Kooy, 
2017). Some cities, such as Tokyo (Nakajima et al., 2010) and Taipei (Liu et al., 2010), have been 
successful in stopping subsidence by implementing effective groundwater management and timely 
development of water supply facilities from surface water sources. A local regulation in Jakarta (Perda 
10/1998) has already been in place since 1998 to regulate groundwater usage by pricing; however, law 
enforcement of this regulation is still weak. Informants hypothesised that the government has exploited 
the unclear cause of subsidence to stall a decision to take a serious action towards water supply 
provision (AC10). We argue that it is important to investigate the cause of subsidence and 
simultaneously provide piped water supply to the people. 
                                                          
8
 In March 2018, the current Governor Baswedan formed a team to monitor the use of groundwater, absorption wells and 
sewage treatment in high-rise buildings in central Jakarta (Hasyim, 2018). This was a response to the city’s excessive 
groundwater use that was exposed in international media (e.g. Kimmelman, 2017). 
9
 No-regret policy is a common term used in decision-making process, particularly in climate-related policy. It has "no hard 
trade-offs with other policy objectives" (Martin, 2012). The benefits of pursuing this option should equal or exceed its costs to 
society. 
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THE 'NEAR-MISS' CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
In this section, we discuss factors that caused the near-miss outcome and broader impacts of the 
juncture. While the corruption scandal enabled the voice of critics to be heard in the public sphere, it 
was unable to change the adoption of the seawall project. We see that delaying the decision as the 
outcome of the juncture was just a way to meet the concerns of the public about the project after the 
corruption scandal was exposed. The intensely politicised process of crisis appears only to perfect the 
existing frames so that the idea can be self-sustained. 
The opponents managed to use political crisis – the type of crisis that the proponent chose to avoid 
– to dismantle the well-entrenched NCICD idea. However, this strategy was not sufficient to trigger 
policy change as it was defeated by the more powerful utilisation of the sinking crisis by the 
proponents. An informant told us how difficult it is to defeat the powerful narratives built by the 
proponent: 
I wanted to make a counterargument [for NCICD through my NGO]. But my boss said, 'Are you sure? That's 
a big narrative that is supported by huge funds. Are you sure you want to fight that narrative? (…) Because 
if you discuss this with the capital we have, we definitely are defeated. This is very big politics and involves 
so many interests'. (…) But we will continue to fight (NG8). 
The inertia of the infrastructural approach in Jakarta’s flood policy (Octavianti and Charles, submitted-
b) has also contributed to this near-miss event. Jakarta’s floods are political in nature, but they have 
been depoliticised by treating them as acts of nature that require technical responses (Padawangi and 
Douglass, 2015). Since the colonial era in the 16th century, Jakarta has consistently pursued 
infrastructural approach to deal with the flood problem. The infrastructural belief inspired some 
contemporary projects, such as an ongoing river canalisation project, although some authors (e.g. 
Gunawan, 2010) have cast doubt on the efficacy of such an approach. Continued reliance on 
infrastructure has created a path dependence and barriers to future changes (Schön and Rein, 1994). 
The giant seawall was able to survive during the critical juncture because it fits with the dominant 
values of infrastructure for safety reason – although in terms of technical and financial feasibility, the 
seawall is subject of much debate. 
Another potential cause of this near-miss outcome is that the government and the critics were 
addressing different sets of problems. The former viewed the need to deal with the flooding threat by 
building the outer seawall, while the latter emphasized the need to deal with the root cause of sinking, 
which is subsidence. These different perceptions and problem definitions have led to unclear policy 
proposals from the critics. It implies that policy alternatives were not ready to be proposed on time, 
which is extremely important given the limited period of a critical juncture (Olsson et al., 2006). 
Although the current critical juncture did not result in policy change, it had an immediate impact on 
the broader political environment, as it successfully put the water policy issue on the government’s 
agenda. The triggered impacts did not necessarily align with the timeline of the juncture. Investments in 
drinking water and sanitation are not only complicated and expensive but also, more importantly, 
invisible in terms of physical structures. This invisibility is a problem in the 'politics of visibility' 
prevailing in the Indonesian political context where local leaders usually use their first five-year 
administration to do actions that are visible, such as creating parks and canals (Shore and Wright, 
2011). The push from NCICD was able to motivate local government to take substantial decisions in the 
water sector. 
The former Governor Purnama has used the opportunity to merge two municipally owned 
companies dealing with water and wastewater (Nastitie, 2015). The implications of this new 
institutional setting are substantial especially for the wastewater sector, since a portion of wastewater 
charge will also be included in the water tariff (LG7). The integration of groundwater management has 
been discussed as well but not yet agreed upon by the stakeholders involved (LG5). Intense water policy 
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debates during the juncture have also contributed directly and indirectly to spur action for both the 
drinking water and wastewater sectors. Regarding sanitation, two zones (Pluit and Duri Kosambi), out 
of 14 zones of wastewater areas in Jakarta, are planned to be constructed within the next five years 
(Kaban, 2016). This resurrection from investment dormancy was primarily pushed by the government’s 
vision, but also the technical need, to have cleaner rivers flowing to the future NCICD’s retention basin. 
Meanwhile, in the drinking-water sector, the subsidence issue has helped increase the urgency of 
having a 100% supply of piped water to stop groundwater extraction. Drinking water services in Jakarta 
are operated under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme. There is very little political support to 
invest in the sector, both in infrastructure (e.g. raw water, distribution network), and in institutions (e.g. 
water tariff). The contract is now being renegotiated between the private companies and the 
government to provide universal access to Jakarta citizens (Viva News, 2016). 
Land subsidence will continue to be a latent problem because of its silent nature. Prolonged 
politicisation of this problem, as observed throughout 2017, did not and is less likely to occur unless a 
major flood hits Jakarta again. In the long run, other critical junctures may increase policy learning and 
add more incremental changes leading to 'partial transition' (Meijerink and Huitema, 2010). This 
accumulation of small changes may also completely deflect the current policy path. The worst 
possibility is that these future junctures are not able to accumulate learning and thus existing 
governance will never be enhanced. Meijerink and Huitema (2010) observed that policy entrepreneurs 
are more interested in institutionalising their policy ideas rather than in preparing the ground prior to 
the critical moment. Therefore, while waiting for another juncture to occur, change advocates can start 
creating spaces for social learning to diversify the 'ways of knowing' the sinking crisis and unlock the 
fixation on particular meanings. 
CONCLUSION 
A crisis can create the need for and the opportunity to push 'a wholesale overturning' in the intellectual 
underpinning of a policy (Hall, 1993). However, for Jakarta’s flood policy, a political crisis (triggered by a 
corruption scandal) was not sufficient to introduce a radical change to scrap the city’s ambitious seawall 
plan (NCICD). We refer to this result as a 'near-miss' outcome as change was possible and sought after 
but narrowly failed to materialise. Having examined the public discourse around the land subsidence 
issue and analysed political interactions during the project’s evaluation period, or the critical juncture, 
we find that the project’s proponents have convincingly used the sinking crisis to justify the seawall 
plan. Therefore, the notion of 'disaster capitalism', whereby actors exploit the fear of disaster to justify 
a capitalist project, prevailed to a large extent to sustain the preference for the NCICD plan, and thus 
offer an explanation for the near-miss outcome. The disputed 17 islands reclamation project, claimed 
by the critics as the capitalist element of the project, has also benefited from this use of crisis framing. 
Our analysis of the "policy game of crisis exploitation" (Boin et al., 2009: 100) suggests that even in the 
wake of threatening crisis episodes radical change does not necessarily occur. In addition to the 
powerful discourse built by the proponents of the NCICD, the near-miss outcome was attributable to 
other factors such as the project’s fit with the city’s infrastructural approach in the management of 
flood risks, and the lack of policy alternatives offered by the critics. 
This study examined the beginning of the NCICD policymaking process that is still ongoing and may 
continue during the next decade. The National Ministry of Planning (Bappenas) even stated that the 
fate of the offshore sea wall may only be decided in 2025 (Syarizka, 2017). It seems that the NCICD 
project is here to stay until a crisis, be it political or natural, generates another critical juncture. Future 
junctures, if unable to introduce a policy change, will at least accumulate learning and contribute to 
shaping a new policy context for the management of flood risk in Jakarta. 
We hope our attempt to unpack the politicisation of the land subsidence issue illuminates how 
actors work to channel particular interests. Much of the attention given to the NCICD, however, should 
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not undermine the urgency of stopping the subsidence problem in the first place. Without serious 
policy instruments to stop subsidence immediately, it may be too costly or worse, too late, to fix the 
problem. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. List of interviewees (Note: CG: central government official, LG: local government official, AC: 
academic, NG: NGO activist, KI: individual expert) 
No Code Description and position Field of expertise or institution 
(in double quotation mark) 
1 CG1 Central Government official 
(minister’s staff) 
Water policy 
2 CG2 Central Government official 
(director) 
Conservation 
3 CG3 Central Government official 
(director) 
Catchment protection 
4 CG4 Central Government official 
(director) 
Inland water management 
5 CG5 Central Government official 
(director) 
Coastal water management 
6 CG6 Central Government official 
(director) 
Sanitation 
7 CG7 Central Government official (head) "Catchment Management Agency" 
8 CG8 Central Government official (staff) "River Basin Organisation" 
9 LG1 Local Government official (deputy) Environment and spatial planning 
10 LG2 Local Government official (head) "Water Management Agency" 
11 LG3 Local Government official (staff) "Jakarta Water Regulatory Body" 
12 LG4 Local Government official (head) "Local Development Planning Board" 
13 LG5 Local Government official (director) "Jakarta’s Water Supply Company" 
14 LG6 Local Government official (head) "Housing Agency" 
15 LG7 Local Government official (director) "Jakarta’s Wastewater Company" 
16 LG8 Local Government official (Mayor) Impact of Jakarta’s development in surrounding 
areas 
17 AC1 Academician (local university) Social and environmental science 
18 AC2 Academician (local university) History of Jakarta 
19 AC3 Academician Water policy 
Water Alternatives - 2018  Volume 11 | Issue 2 
Octavianti and Charles: Jakarta’s seawall megaproject Page | 414 
20 AC4 Academician (local university) Urban development 
21 AC5 Academician (local university) Urban development 
22 AC6 Academician (local university) Urban development 
23 AC7 Academician (local university) NCICD – technical challenges 
24 AC8 Academician (local university) Water supply 
25 AC9 Academician (local university) Urban development 
26 AC10 Academician (local university) NCICD – policy making process 
27 AC11 Academician (foreign university) Social movement 
28 AC12 Academician (foreign university) NCICD – technical challenges 
29 NG1 NGO activist (head) Biodiversity and community engagement 
30 NG2 NGO activist Biodiversity and community engagement 
31 NG3 NGO activist (head) Flood measures and community engagement 
32 NG4 NGO activist Adaptation and urban development 
33 NG5 NGO activist Urban development 
34 NG6 NGO activist (head) Normalisation and community engagement 
35 NG7 NGO activist (head) Urban development 
36 NG8 NGO activist (head) Urban development 
37 KI1 Individual expert History of Jakarta 
38 KI2 Individual expert (director) Urban development 
39 KI3 Individual expert Development assistance 
40 KI4 Individual expert Urban development 
41 KI5 Consultant (head) NCICD – policy making process 
42 KI6 Consultant, former Central 
Government official (vice deputy) 
NCICD – policy making process 
43 KI7 Industry representatives Private water supply company 
44  KI8 Consultant Jakarta’s political economy 
45 KI9 Industry representatives Private water supply company 
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